BRINGING THE NUCLEAR CONTROVERSY INTO THE LIGHT - Harding
Posted: Sun Mar 14, 2010 9:51 pmBRINGING THE NUCLEAR CONTROVERSY INTO THE LIGHT: how have attitudes and worldviews changed over a third of a century?
By Jim Harding, Retired Professor and past Director, School of Human Justice and Prairie Justice Research, and Adjunct Professor of Justice Studies, University of Regina
Prepared for presentation with Brett Dolter and Katherine Arbuthnott, “The Nuclear Debate in Saskatchewan Across the Generations”, at Sustainability Fair, Campion College, University of Regina, March 1, 2010
Posted: http://jimharding.brinkster.net
During 2009 the Uranium Development Partnership (UDP) consultations showed a groundswell of opposition to nuclear power and other recommended expansions of the nuclear fuel system in Saskatchewan. (1) For government, the Chamber of Commerce and the big city media this all came as a surprise. There had been no widespread opposition to uranium mining since the federal-provincial inquiries of the 1990s, proponents had come to accept the superficial polling results suggesting people here were ready to embrace nuclear power, and the governing Saskatchewan Party and the opposition NDP both supported some version of value-adding to the uranium industry.
The UDP process was the first extensive public airing on the nuclear controversy since the uranium inquiries of 1977-1980. Until the NDP government under Premier Blakeney embraced the uranium industry as a pillar of its public ownership and economic development plan in the late 1970s the uranium mining had gone on in the secrecy of the nuclear arms race. Until then the Saskatchewan people knew next to nothing about where uranium was mined, where it was sent and what it was used for. Under such circumstances it was impossible to form informed opinion or democratic consent.
1. THE URANIUM INQUIRY DATABASE
It’s been a long struggle for us to bring this industry and its ecological and military footprint into the light. I returned to my home province of Saskatchewan from teaching environmental studies in Ontario just before the Cluff Lake Board of Inquiry (CLBI) was established in February 1977. I started my learning curve about nuclear technology during the Ban-The -Bomb days but it steepened when I taught environmental health at the University of Waterloo. Opposition was building to expanding nuclear plants and soon after I left Ontario its Royal Commission on Electric Power Planning called for a moratorium on nuclear power due to the build-up of nuclear wastes. It seemed that if we were to ever bring this industry into the light we’d need to look at the full nuclear fuel system, from mining to nuclear weapons to nuclear power and wastes. And we’d have to place the compartmentalized promotions and promises into a solid context of both sustainability and accountability, where claims were tested against independent and credible information and knowledge. This would not be easy.
I participated in the CLBI as a founding member of the Regina Group for a Non-Nuclear Society (RGNNS) and as an expert witness on social impact. There was a lot of disinformation and semantic manipulation from nuclear corporations and the social democratic government already in joint-ventures with uranium multinationals before the inquiry started, so I decided to try to bring some objectivity to the controversy by studying the inquiries using social science methods. In 1982 I received major funding from the SSHRC’s Human Context of Science and Technology (HCST) strategic grant program and began systematic research on the three inquiries that had taken place; on the uranium mine proposed at Cluff Lake by the French company Amok (now Cogema-Areva), on the uranium refinery proposed at Warman, near Saskatoon, by the federal crown Eldorado Nuclear, and supported by Saskatchewan’s Blakeney government; and on the uranium mine at Key Lake proposed by the German company Uranerz.
Our research was ongoing from 1982-1997, after which I took early retirement from the University of Regina. In that 15-year period we assembled the most extensive content-analysis database on the nuclear controversy anywhere, and published several reports and papers. It was fitting that this research was being done in Saskatchewan as this region was quickly becoming the major front-end of the global nuclear system.
There were 914 participants in these three uranium-related inquiries. A stratified random sample was taken for each inquiry to enable us to do in-depth content-analysis; and some people who were central to the events, such as the Commissioners and counsel for the proponents, were also “self-sampled”. We ended up with a sample of 315 participants which was organized into four files: 84 participants for the CLBI formal hearings, 97 participants for the CLBI local hearings, 69 participants for the Warman hearings, and 80 participants for the Key Lake Board of Inquiry (KLBI) formal and local hearings combined. A comprehensive database was then constructed out of exhaustive transcript coding for attitudes and minor and major themes and socio-demographic, occupation and affiliation identifiers.
1.1 THE PARAMETERS OF THE SAMPLE
The database had 236 participants from Saskatchewan and 79 from out of-province or with residence initially unknown. (We obtained more reliable and extensive demographic information as the study proceeded, including from the 1986 follow-up study.) There were 101 participants from urban areas (Regina and Saskatoon), 46 from the rural south, and 89 from the north, who were later coded as indigenous or non-indigenous. There were 253 men and 62 women in the sample, which reflected the huge gender bias regarding science, technology and public policy, and set the stage from some compelling gender analysis of the nuclear controversy.
Here I won’t summarize the findings on all inquiry sub-groups. Though preliminary analysis was done, we did not get to thoroughly analyze all files. The plan was to find more research funds to do this and complete several sub-studies (e.g. gender and nuclear, etc.) but several research files including the tapes containing the computerized database got discarded into the University of Regina garbage bin. (This happened when the Dean of Social Work imposed an arbitrary timetable for evacuating the Prairie Justice Resource (PJR) room, before the School of Human Justice had even arranged new space with its planned move to Arts.) By the time I was informed of this “mishap” the computer file had gone to Regina’s city dump. This was a demoralizing setback for this important, exhaustive and expensive publicly-funded research. It made me more personally aware of how the knowledge passed or not passed on from the past always has a political and ideological story. Power and authority can encourage or impel the pursuit of knowledge in many indirect and subtle ways.
But I am not reporting on all the analysis that was completed because this isn’t required for my purposes, and this material is available through other sources. I will first summarize the results from the analysis of the CLBI Local Hearings, which reflected the views on uranium mining of a broad range of people, similar to the UDP consultations. Furthermore, since 12 of the 23 communities where these Local Hearings were held in 1977 are the same ones visited by the UDP consultations in 2009, there is some possibility for comparisons, though not for actual persons. Second, I will report on our 1986 follow-up study of participants in the three uranium inquiries. This study allowed us to check and enhance our original coding of attitudes and themes and, most vital, to explore any changes that may have occurred for participants over the decade since the inquiries began. It also allowed us to assess in more depth the themes reflecting the diverging worldviews found among proponents, opponents and those supporting a moratorium. Finally, since the follow-up study used the 315 participants in the original database created from all the uranium inquiries it could allow some broad -based comparisons with the results of the UDP consultations.
2. ATTITUDES IN LOCAL HEARINGS IN 1977-78
Local hearings were held in 23 Saskatchewan communities as part of the CLBI. These local hearings generated 2,182 pages of transcripts over a 23-day period. This was about one-fifth of the 10,786 pages from the formal hearings which lasted 67 days. The Formal, more technical, hearings allowed for more in-depth analysis of science and technology, the ideology of science, the nuclear industry, environmental impact and policy issues. But the Local hearings included about twice the participants as the Formal hearings and represented more “grass-roots” people from across the province. The views of northern indigenous and non-indigenous, southern rural and urban, male and female could therefore all be compared.
Participation in these Local hearings, particularly in the north, was extremely high. Almost one-half (165 of 336) of those who attended and participated in some way in the 23 hearings came from the north, and the majority (118 of 165) were indigenous northerners. More than half of the Local hearings (14 of 23) were held in the north even though the northern population was only 28,000 of the province’s nearly 1,000,000 people at the time. The participation rate of northerners, particularly indigenous northerners, was therefore a lot higher than in the south. The head of the CLBI, Judge Bayda, said he wanted to ensure he and the other two commissioners heard from those living in the north, where the uranium mine expansion would occur. And they did. Whether, with their own pro-uranium industry biases, which were analyzed separately, they could really “hear” what people were saying, is another question. It seems unquestionable that Dan Perrins listened better in the UDP consultations.
One hundred and thirteen (113) people were sampled from those who directly participated in these Local hearings. The 113 were then reduced to 97 participants after it was found that some of those sampled were minor speakers within the transcripts for other sampled participants and there were insufficient transcripts to make coding worthwhile. The final sample was quite diverse as it included 32 indigenous persons, 18 non-indigenous northerners, 35 rural and 28 urban participants. Furthermore, the transcripts for these participants included 47% of the total southern and 55% of the total northern transcripts. The generalizability of the research results is therefore very solid.
Codes were created, tested and revised and coding reliability was established in an earlier pilot study. Then all the transcripts associated with the sampled participants were coded, with participants all pseudo-identified to ensure that coders had no knowledge of participant characteristics or affiliations. Coding was done for attitudes to the uranium mine as well as for major and related minor themes which reflected differing views among proponents, opponents and indigenous participants. The attitude codes used were: none, questions only, support moratorium, unconditional pro, unconditional con, neutral, conditional pro and conditional con. The major themes addressed the provincial economy, northern development, energy policy, ecology and technology, science and knowledge, the inquiry process and the regulatory process. There were proponent and opponent versions of each, with many minor themes developed for each. The final codebook included about 400 discrete codes. Only attitudes from the Local Hearings are reported in 2.1 and 2.2 below.
2.1 NO INDIGENOUS SUPPORT FOR URANIUM MINE
Only 19 participants in the sample of 97, none indigenous, were coded as either unconditionally or conditionally in support of the uranium mine, whereas 35 participants were coded as unconditionally or conditionally opposing the mine. Another 31 supported a moratorium. The support for a moratorium was distributed across the sample: 13 indigenous persons, 9 urban, 5 non-indigenous northerners and 4 rural participants. When those coded as out-rightly opposed to the uranium mine at Cluff Lake were grouped with those wanting a moratorium on the mine it was found that 66 of 97 or 68% of the Local hearings sample did not want the mine to go ahead. Though there was diverse reasoning, 81.5% of urban, 75% of rural and 71% of indigenous participants did not support the go-ahead of the uranium mine. This actual measure of the views of participants did not jibe with, and was overshadowed by, all the “uranium boom” fanfare coming from government and industry and steadily highlighted (“reported”) in the mass media. Remember that the government was both responsible for the inquiry process and a co-owner, through its crown the Saskatchewan Mining and Development Corporation (SMDC), of the uranium ventures under review. In retrospect it seems fair to say the Cluff Lake mine was steamrolled through in spite of the views of local people in the hearings. There is also strong evidence that the go-ahead was given prior to the CLBI completing its recommendations, and we know for sure that the second uranium mine, at Key Lake, was already draining lakes prior to the CLBI reporting. Once the chronology of events is carefully studied it’s hard not to see these inquiries as tools of political legitimacy.
The breakdown of attitudes is most revealing. As already stated, no indigenous participants were among the proponents. Meanwhile, in the media and proponent and pro-uranium elite circles, uranium mining was continually promoted as not only being good for northern development but as having support among needy northerners. “Northerner” was used to include participants from First Nations and Métis communities, as well as non-indigenous northerners living in places like Uranium City and La Ronge. However, when the views of indigenous participants were empirically analyzed it was found that 50% supported a moratorium, 25% were unsure about the project and the rest were out-rightly opposed. There certainly was no groundswell of indigenous support for the uranium mine. Furthermore, all the indigenous organizations, including the District Chiefs and Métis Society had already called for a moratorium on uranium mining and inclusion of Aboriginal Rights in the CLBI, and when this was refused, they boycotted the CLBI. It was also found that it was the non-indigenous northerners that supported the go-ahead of the uranium mine; 11 of 18 or 61% of them in the Local hearings sample supported the mine. Cross-tabulation showed that these 11 were among the 12 sampled participants who lived in majority non-indigenous communities. Ten came from the mining town of Uranium City, which had been involved in uranium mining for U.S. nuclear weapons since the 1950s. Ironically, once the more profitable Cluff Lake and Key Lake mines went into production, the much lower-grade uranium mines at Uranium City were shut down and the town was depopulated. The Gunner mine near Uranium City which opened in 1953 still has not been safely decommissioned and radioactive contaminants continue to spread into the adjacent environment. For a while the federal government even allowed a fish plant to be operated from its toxic site.
The strategy of promoting uranium mining as being in the interests of poverty-stricken northern indigenous communities did not succeed because there was support for the uranium mine among northern indigenous participants in the Local hearings. It succeeded because the views of northern people were not accurately reported in the provincial media or taken seriously by the inquiry process. And the notion that uranium mining was a way to “develop” the north was an ideological story-line that resonated well in some circles in the south. It was attractive because it continued with paternalism towards indigenous people and yet could be made to sound like a step towards self-determination. Northerners, indigenous or otherwise, were not given any fundamental say over what kind of development path they would take. And any inquiry recommendations that might have strengthened their participation, such as a Northern Development Board or revenue-sharing, were rejected outright by a string of governments.
2.2 MORE WOMEN AGAINST URANIUM MINING
The importance of gender in attitudes to uranium mining became apparent in the study of Local hearings. Over half the women in the participants sample (54.8%) were coded as either unconditionally or conditionally opposed to uranium mining, compared to just over one-quarter (29.6%) of all the men. Meanwhile it was found that all (100%) of the non-indigenous northern women were coded as either unconditionally or conditionally in support of the mine. This compared to less than half (48%) of the non-indigenous northern men, over a third (38%) of whom supported a moratorium. As stated earlier, over one-half of all indigenous participants also supported a moratorium. These findings showed the need to contextualize gender within the political economy of uranium mining. The more dependent women were on the industry, the more supportive they were, even while men who had proximity to and may have even worked within the industry, expressed some doubts about it.
The gender gap continued in urban and rural, southern Saskatchewan. In the big cities of Regina and Saskatoon, two-thirds (66.7%) of the women in the Local hearing sample were coded as either unconditionally or conditionally in opposition to uranium mining. This compared to one-third (38.9%) of the urban men in the sample. In rural Saskatchewan a huge majority of women participants (87.5%) were coded as opposing uranium mining, compared to 50% of the rural men in the Local hearings. The results of this analysis were modeled to show how gender and attitudes interrelate. A continuum of support to opposition existed from: i) all non-indigenous women in the north wholeheartedly supporting uranium mining, to ii) no indigenous women in the north supporting and some opposing uranium mining, to iii) no urban women supporting and a majority opposing uranium mining, to iv) the vast majority of rural women opposing uranium mining.
3. TEN YEARS AFTER THE INQUIRIES
In 1986 we initiated a follow-up study to see what reflections participants had about the previous inquiries and whether their views had altered. We started with the 315 participants in our original database, and found that after so many years it was challenging and very time-consuming to successfully trace 169 of these people down. Then by using these contacts to gain further information about the whereabouts of past participants we assembled contact information for 209 people, or 66.6% of the original sample. These people were all invited by mail to participate in the follow-up study. Out of this process we were able to directly contact 114 people in Saskatchewan by mail, telephone or actual visits. With another 20 contacted from out of province we had 134 people, or 73.2% of the 209 we had tracked down. Of these, 28 could not or chose not to participate further. So the follow-up study was based on 106 of the original participants from the uranium inquiry database, 90 of whom were directly interviewed and 16 of whom completed a detailed mail-out questionnaire. Being able to interview 54.7% of those we tracked down, and 33.7 % of the participants in the original database, is good for such follow-up research.
3.1 OPPOSITION GROWING AMONG MEN
The follow-up study enabled us to evaluate changes in attitudes over the period since the inquiries took place. The biggest change was among indigenous men, where a marked shift occurred from large support for a moratorium in 1977-1980 to 50% being out-rightly opposed to uranium mining in 1986. Also there was no support at all for uranium mining among the indigenous men in the follow-up study. This shift was found whether participants were analyzed as indigenous men or in terms of being associated with aboriginal organizations. In contrast to this shift, non-indigenous northerners were slightly more (now 46%) supportive of uranium mining. It’s worth speculating whether this reflected a polarization occurring over the uranium industry along neo-colonial lines in the north.
Interestingly, non-Saskatchewan men also showed a slight shift over this decade towards more opposition to uranium mining. A large shift towards opposition occurred among rural men (58% by 1986). Rural women were already mostly opposed, but in 1986 the overall opposition among all rural participants grew to 72%. There was an anomaly, in the shift found from opposition to more support for a moratorium among urban women, which may relate the size of this urban sub-sample (both men and women) growing from 25% to 46% of all participants in the follow-up study compared to the original database. (It turned out to be much easier to trace down urban than other participants.) But based on the participants own views of their attitudes in 1977-80 and changes by 1986, there was an overall 38.7% increase in opposition compared to a 5.1% increase in support for uranium mining. The shift was mostly among indigenous, rural and urban men.
In the follow-up study we also found that some of those previously placed in the “moratorium” category actually remembered supporting or opposing the uranium industry. So we added two new attitude categories, “proponent moratorium” and “opponent moratorium”. There were 27 of the 106 originally in the moratorium category but with the new codes this dropped to only 9 of 106. Fourteen of the 18 who were placed in the new categories were men (7 of 8 in proponent moratorium and 7 of 10 in the opponent moratorium), which confirms that women were more categorical. With this reanalysis we ended up with 47 of 106 or 44.4% in support of the uranium industry and 50 of 106 or 47.2% in opposition, which presents a much more polarized view of the controversy. Those not wanting to proceed with the mine, including those re-categorized as “proponent moratorium” were now 54.7% of those in the follow-up study compared to 36.8% favouring the go-ahead of the uranium project.
Changes could also be tracked through the coding of major themes. We found some marked changes regarding views of the inquiry process. In the follow-up study participants remembered their views at the time of the inquiries to be much more pro-inquiry than anti-inquiry. The only exception to this was among indigenous and non-indigenous northern men, which may suggest some skepticism about the southern-created inquiry process among all northerners at the time. However, the views registered ten years after the inquiries contrasted sharply with this. Pro-inquiry major theme codes for the same participants dropped from 58 to only 5 and anti-inquiry major theme codes grew from 30 to 52 over this decade. The percentage of all major theme codes that were pro-inquiry dropped from 7.1% in 1977-80 to .06% in 1986, whereas the percentage for anti-inquiry major theme codes went from 3.6% to 5.9% over this period. It’s noteworthy that this change is primarily for men, as women, overall, seemed less interested in evaluating the inquiry process. When major themes on the inquiry process were analyzed by “association groups” it was found that change in the direction of being more critical of the inquiries occurred for all groups except for proponents.
Two main things can be concluded from these findings. First, a decade after the uranium inquiries, the same participants were more opposed to uranium mining; and second, they were more critical of the inquiry process. And it’s interesting that these changes mostly involved men, who could be said to be catching up with what most women participating in the inquiries had already concluded. A lot happened in that decade, though exactly what triggered these attitudinal changes cannot be specifically gleaned from the data. There were major spills at uranium mines during the period between the initial inquiries and our follow-up study which probably played some role. Furthermore, many of the economic benefits promised for indigenous northerners, when the inquiries were high-profile, had not accrued. If these attitudinal changes are generalizable and persistent they could have laid the ground for the outpouring of criticism about the composition and bias of the UDP and the initial broad public skepticism about how the UDP consultations would be run. Perhaps a fragmented, buried, collective memory from experiences with the earlier inquiries found expression during the UDP public consultations. Change occurs on many levels and in many ways and bigger changes often come from accumulating smaller ones.
4. THE SHIFT TO THE SOFT ENERGY PATH
The UDP was about adding economic value to the uranium industry by expanding the nuclear fuel system in Saskatchewan, including building nuclear power plants. In promoting this the ruling Saskatchewan Party was following in the path carved out since the 1980s by the NDP. The NDP was forced by its members and public opinion to draw the line for its support for the uranium-nuclear industry at nuclear power, meaning they supported sending uranium to other places, where nuclear wastes would accumulate and weapons material could be diverted. And they put on their moral blinders about the use of depleted uranium, left from enriching uranium from Saskatchewan, in DU weapons in recent wars. The public consultations, however, showed that there was much greater support (80-85% of 2,263 responses) for going non-nuclear and moving towards renewable energy than for the pro-nuclear UDP report. When on December 19, 2009 the Saskatchewan Party government said they would not follow the UDP recommendation to build nuclear plants in Saskatchewan they ended up with the same contradictory policy as the NDP.
Is there anything in our research from the 1970s and 1980s that was embryonic for this groundswell of support for the soft energy path? The transcript and follow-up studies included a major theme that encapsulates the thinking leading to soft energy. It reads, “The perpetual growth in the demand for energy (including nuclear) is unnecessary and unrealistic in a world of limited resources and will not sustain a quality of life for present or future generations.” It’s instructive to look at the relative place of this theme among the 14 major themes coded for those supporting and opposing uranium mining. And to consider how the implicit support for soft energy reflected by this theme fits into the oppositional and alternative “green” paradigm that we found emerging at the time of the uranium inquiries.
4.1 WERE WOMEN FORGING THE PARADIGM SHIFT?
I have already discussed how gender, economy and geography intersect in a continuum of opposition. If we analyze the distribution of major themes among participants in the follow-up study we find this continuum of opposition goes from its highest among rural women to its lowest among non-indigenous women in the north. Indigenous women are the second most opposed group; while non-Saskatchewan men are the second least opposed (third most supportive). Urban women are the third most opposed group, whereas urban men are the third least opposed (third most supportive). Rural men are the fourth most opposed group, whereas indigenous men are the third least opposed (third most supportive). Non-indigenous northern men sit in the middle, but, based on this major theme analysis, are more opposed than supportive.
How do these groups compare insofar as support for soft, renewable energy? Were any findings from our follow-up study in 1986 suggestive of the strong non-nuclear, pro-renewable views that Perrins found in the UDP consultations in 2009? I believe there are signs of what was to come, though the paradigm shift that was measureable in the 1970s and 1980s was more about values and worldview than about energy policy per se.
In our 1986 study we thematically coded how participants remembered their views during the inquiry. It is these findings that I will concentrate on here. Ninety-five percent (95%) of the major themes of rural women, the group most in opposition to uranium mining, were oppositional. Support for soft energy was the fifth highest theme, at 11% of all this group’s themes. This was the same percentage that was shown for the theme that supports a more holistic, non-scientistic approach to knowledge. The themes most emphasized by rural women were ecological sustainability (29% of themes), distrust of the regulatory system (21%) and support for a sustainable economy (19%). The least mentioned themes had to do with the north and the inquiry process. So while explicit support for soft energy was not that high, when the underlying notion of “sustainability” is considered, a paradigm shift, forged by these women, is more evident. Nearly three-quarters (70%) of the major themes of rural women reflect this paradigm shift in some way and I will take this as a benchmark for comparing other groups.
Ninety-three percent (93%) of the major themes emphasized by indigenous women were oppositional. And, interestingly, support for soft energy was the second/third highest, at 19% of total themes remembered from the inquiries. This was the same percentage as the theme stressing sustainable northern development. It is very noteworthy that the most emphasized theme among indigenous women was about skepticism for the state’s regulation of environmental health (31% of all their themes). Ecological sustainability and holistic knowledge were the two least emphasized themes, at 6% each; and a sustainable economy was fourth highest, at 12.5% of all themes. If we add up the same themes as we did for rural women we get only 43% of all themes; however the additional of northern sustainability (19% of all themes) brings the total percent close to that of rural women (62.5% compared to 70% of all themes). And it is to be expected that women living in or connected to the north will express their attitudes and values through a different lens than rural women.
Just how important is gender in this apparent shift to support non-nuclear technology and ecological sustainability? This is not self-evident as the non-indigenous northern women had an astonishing 97% of their major themes supporting uranium mining. And they showed no support at all for soft energy. This confirms that attitudes intersect with proximity to and perceived dependency upon the uranium industry. In other words political economy and related ideological-cultural factors contextualize gender differences. And it seems that proximity can work both ways. While non-indigenous women living in the north were highly supportive of uranium mining; so, too, were men living out of province. While these men had a political economic and ideological link to the industry or to pro-nuclear government departments they did not live in proximity to, or directly face the consequences of, the uranium mines. It’s obviously easily to support something that benefits you while you are at a safe distance. While proponents were pushing through uranium mines in indigenous regions of northern Saskatchewan, non-indigenous people in British Columbia and Nova Scotia whose watersheds and human health would be directly affected were winning moratoria on uranium mining. These moratoria have now been legislated in both provinces. People in New Brunswick, Quebec and the Ottawa region are presently working for a similar ban on uranium mining. It’s hard not to see this double standard as being racialistic and neo-colonial.
Nevertheless, the third most oppositional group, with 76% of their major themes opposing uranium mining, was also women – urban women. Did these women support soft energy and did they show signs of a paradigm shift towards sustainability? Only eleven percent (11%) of all their major themes supported soft energy, which is the same as among rural women. And the major theme for ecological sustainability was lower for urban women; 19% of all themes compared to 29% for rural women. So, too, was the major theme about a sustainable economy (8% compared to 19%) and the one on holistic knowledge (6% compared to 11%). If you add up the major themes that reflect a paradigm shift you get a much smaller total of 45% of all themes compared to 70% for rural women. Even if you add in the greater percentages for the major theme stressing northern sustainability, urban women don’t come very close to rural or indigenous women.
4.2 THE CULTURAL AND ETHICAL SHIFT
How did support for soft energy stack up for men? Rural men, non-indigenous and indigenous men were similar in the percentage of major themes showing opposition to uranium mining (57%, 57% and 55% respectively). However none of these groups of men came close to the female groups in their emphasis on soft energy. This major theme was only 4% of all themes for rural and non-indigenous northern men, and only 2.5% of all themes for indigenous men. This suggests men, including indigenous men, were far more tied to conventional industrial technology which extracts non-renewable resources. We can still see this inclination among some local non-indigenous male business leaders and Métis and First Nations male leaders in the province. Nor were the major themes which reflect a paradigm shifts towards sustainability as predominant among male groups. When ecology, economy and knowledge are added in with soft energy this still only totaled 39% of all rural male themes, 30% of all non-indigenous northern male themes and 25.5% of those for indigenous men. The major themes of urban men were more supportive of uranium mining than they were oppositional (65% to 35%), and the theme for soft energy was only 6% of the total themes for this group. If you add in ecology, economy and knowledge you still only get 23% of all themes, which is about one-half that for urban women.
So, once the matter of direct dependency and proximity is addressed there seems to be strong indication from both our transcript study of Local hearings, and from our 1986 follow-up study, that women, whether indigenous or not, were far more along in this paradigm shift; though rural women seem to be where the shift was most marked. While there is not a major focus on soft energy per se, the values and thinking that lie behind and complement this are already pronounced.
Was this a precursor to what Dolter and Arbuthnott call the “new ecology Identity” of those who during the UDP consultations so stringently opposed the expansion of the nuclear fuel system in Saskatchewan? Does it reflect what they call the value of “unacceptable risk” upheld by opponents to the UDP’s pro-nuclear recommendations; the unwillingness to trade-off future burdens for short-term benefits? Is this, then, fundamentally about the sustainability ethic of inter-generational justice? Do the comparative differences and the shifts found in our research in the 1970s and 1980s already reflect a moving away from the patriarchal stratification of society and knowledge and the objectification of nature, along the lines emphasized by “eco-feminism”? Is the paradigm shift coming more from a convergence that includes post-colonial consciousness that doesn’t necessary express itself in feminism? Are we perhaps seeing a deep historical shift in our cultural and ethical worldview from scientism towards sustainability?
When you consider the historical origins of uranium mining and the nuclear industry in the military and the ongoing threat from weapons proliferation, and the radioactive contamination that occurs from mine tailings to nuclear reactor releases and wastes, it should probably come as no surprise that the nuclear controversy is a catalyst for such a paradigm shift. An in-depth analysis of the UDP consultations may show the shift is spreading across more groupings; there are already some indications that the shift is occurring with the upcoming, more deeply “green” generations. The most interesting question is when the shift will start to directly affect indigenous politics in the north and what role indigenous women will play in this. March 1, 2010
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[1] Dan Perrins, Future of Uranium Public Consultation Process, Prepared for Saskatchewan Ministry of Energy and Resources, August 31, 2009.
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Note: This paper will be posted at my website – http://jimharding.brinkster.net
By Jim Harding, Retired Professor and past Director, School of Human Justice and Prairie Justice Research, and Adjunct Professor of Justice Studies, University of Regina
Prepared for presentation with Brett Dolter and Katherine Arbuthnott, “The Nuclear Debate in Saskatchewan Across the Generations”, at Sustainability Fair, Campion College, University of Regina, March 1, 2010
Posted: http://jimharding.brinkster.net
During 2009 the Uranium Development Partnership (UDP) consultations showed a groundswell of opposition to nuclear power and other recommended expansions of the nuclear fuel system in Saskatchewan. (1) For government, the Chamber of Commerce and the big city media this all came as a surprise. There had been no widespread opposition to uranium mining since the federal-provincial inquiries of the 1990s, proponents had come to accept the superficial polling results suggesting people here were ready to embrace nuclear power, and the governing Saskatchewan Party and the opposition NDP both supported some version of value-adding to the uranium industry.
The UDP process was the first extensive public airing on the nuclear controversy since the uranium inquiries of 1977-1980. Until the NDP government under Premier Blakeney embraced the uranium industry as a pillar of its public ownership and economic development plan in the late 1970s the uranium mining had gone on in the secrecy of the nuclear arms race. Until then the Saskatchewan people knew next to nothing about where uranium was mined, where it was sent and what it was used for. Under such circumstances it was impossible to form informed opinion or democratic consent.
1. THE URANIUM INQUIRY DATABASE
It’s been a long struggle for us to bring this industry and its ecological and military footprint into the light. I returned to my home province of Saskatchewan from teaching environmental studies in Ontario just before the Cluff Lake Board of Inquiry (CLBI) was established in February 1977. I started my learning curve about nuclear technology during the Ban-The -Bomb days but it steepened when I taught environmental health at the University of Waterloo. Opposition was building to expanding nuclear plants and soon after I left Ontario its Royal Commission on Electric Power Planning called for a moratorium on nuclear power due to the build-up of nuclear wastes. It seemed that if we were to ever bring this industry into the light we’d need to look at the full nuclear fuel system, from mining to nuclear weapons to nuclear power and wastes. And we’d have to place the compartmentalized promotions and promises into a solid context of both sustainability and accountability, where claims were tested against independent and credible information and knowledge. This would not be easy.
I participated in the CLBI as a founding member of the Regina Group for a Non-Nuclear Society (RGNNS) and as an expert witness on social impact. There was a lot of disinformation and semantic manipulation from nuclear corporations and the social democratic government already in joint-ventures with uranium multinationals before the inquiry started, so I decided to try to bring some objectivity to the controversy by studying the inquiries using social science methods. In 1982 I received major funding from the SSHRC’s Human Context of Science and Technology (HCST) strategic grant program and began systematic research on the three inquiries that had taken place; on the uranium mine proposed at Cluff Lake by the French company Amok (now Cogema-Areva), on the uranium refinery proposed at Warman, near Saskatoon, by the federal crown Eldorado Nuclear, and supported by Saskatchewan’s Blakeney government; and on the uranium mine at Key Lake proposed by the German company Uranerz.
Our research was ongoing from 1982-1997, after which I took early retirement from the University of Regina. In that 15-year period we assembled the most extensive content-analysis database on the nuclear controversy anywhere, and published several reports and papers. It was fitting that this research was being done in Saskatchewan as this region was quickly becoming the major front-end of the global nuclear system.
There were 914 participants in these three uranium-related inquiries. A stratified random sample was taken for each inquiry to enable us to do in-depth content-analysis; and some people who were central to the events, such as the Commissioners and counsel for the proponents, were also “self-sampled”. We ended up with a sample of 315 participants which was organized into four files: 84 participants for the CLBI formal hearings, 97 participants for the CLBI local hearings, 69 participants for the Warman hearings, and 80 participants for the Key Lake Board of Inquiry (KLBI) formal and local hearings combined. A comprehensive database was then constructed out of exhaustive transcript coding for attitudes and minor and major themes and socio-demographic, occupation and affiliation identifiers.
1.1 THE PARAMETERS OF THE SAMPLE
The database had 236 participants from Saskatchewan and 79 from out of-province or with residence initially unknown. (We obtained more reliable and extensive demographic information as the study proceeded, including from the 1986 follow-up study.) There were 101 participants from urban areas (Regina and Saskatoon), 46 from the rural south, and 89 from the north, who were later coded as indigenous or non-indigenous. There were 253 men and 62 women in the sample, which reflected the huge gender bias regarding science, technology and public policy, and set the stage from some compelling gender analysis of the nuclear controversy.
Here I won’t summarize the findings on all inquiry sub-groups. Though preliminary analysis was done, we did not get to thoroughly analyze all files. The plan was to find more research funds to do this and complete several sub-studies (e.g. gender and nuclear, etc.) but several research files including the tapes containing the computerized database got discarded into the University of Regina garbage bin. (This happened when the Dean of Social Work imposed an arbitrary timetable for evacuating the Prairie Justice Resource (PJR) room, before the School of Human Justice had even arranged new space with its planned move to Arts.) By the time I was informed of this “mishap” the computer file had gone to Regina’s city dump. This was a demoralizing setback for this important, exhaustive and expensive publicly-funded research. It made me more personally aware of how the knowledge passed or not passed on from the past always has a political and ideological story. Power and authority can encourage or impel the pursuit of knowledge in many indirect and subtle ways.
But I am not reporting on all the analysis that was completed because this isn’t required for my purposes, and this material is available through other sources. I will first summarize the results from the analysis of the CLBI Local Hearings, which reflected the views on uranium mining of a broad range of people, similar to the UDP consultations. Furthermore, since 12 of the 23 communities where these Local Hearings were held in 1977 are the same ones visited by the UDP consultations in 2009, there is some possibility for comparisons, though not for actual persons. Second, I will report on our 1986 follow-up study of participants in the three uranium inquiries. This study allowed us to check and enhance our original coding of attitudes and themes and, most vital, to explore any changes that may have occurred for participants over the decade since the inquiries began. It also allowed us to assess in more depth the themes reflecting the diverging worldviews found among proponents, opponents and those supporting a moratorium. Finally, since the follow-up study used the 315 participants in the original database created from all the uranium inquiries it could allow some broad -based comparisons with the results of the UDP consultations.
2. ATTITUDES IN LOCAL HEARINGS IN 1977-78
Local hearings were held in 23 Saskatchewan communities as part of the CLBI. These local hearings generated 2,182 pages of transcripts over a 23-day period. This was about one-fifth of the 10,786 pages from the formal hearings which lasted 67 days. The Formal, more technical, hearings allowed for more in-depth analysis of science and technology, the ideology of science, the nuclear industry, environmental impact and policy issues. But the Local hearings included about twice the participants as the Formal hearings and represented more “grass-roots” people from across the province. The views of northern indigenous and non-indigenous, southern rural and urban, male and female could therefore all be compared.
Participation in these Local hearings, particularly in the north, was extremely high. Almost one-half (165 of 336) of those who attended and participated in some way in the 23 hearings came from the north, and the majority (118 of 165) were indigenous northerners. More than half of the Local hearings (14 of 23) were held in the north even though the northern population was only 28,000 of the province’s nearly 1,000,000 people at the time. The participation rate of northerners, particularly indigenous northerners, was therefore a lot higher than in the south. The head of the CLBI, Judge Bayda, said he wanted to ensure he and the other two commissioners heard from those living in the north, where the uranium mine expansion would occur. And they did. Whether, with their own pro-uranium industry biases, which were analyzed separately, they could really “hear” what people were saying, is another question. It seems unquestionable that Dan Perrins listened better in the UDP consultations.
One hundred and thirteen (113) people were sampled from those who directly participated in these Local hearings. The 113 were then reduced to 97 participants after it was found that some of those sampled were minor speakers within the transcripts for other sampled participants and there were insufficient transcripts to make coding worthwhile. The final sample was quite diverse as it included 32 indigenous persons, 18 non-indigenous northerners, 35 rural and 28 urban participants. Furthermore, the transcripts for these participants included 47% of the total southern and 55% of the total northern transcripts. The generalizability of the research results is therefore very solid.
Codes were created, tested and revised and coding reliability was established in an earlier pilot study. Then all the transcripts associated with the sampled participants were coded, with participants all pseudo-identified to ensure that coders had no knowledge of participant characteristics or affiliations. Coding was done for attitudes to the uranium mine as well as for major and related minor themes which reflected differing views among proponents, opponents and indigenous participants. The attitude codes used were: none, questions only, support moratorium, unconditional pro, unconditional con, neutral, conditional pro and conditional con. The major themes addressed the provincial economy, northern development, energy policy, ecology and technology, science and knowledge, the inquiry process and the regulatory process. There were proponent and opponent versions of each, with many minor themes developed for each. The final codebook included about 400 discrete codes. Only attitudes from the Local Hearings are reported in 2.1 and 2.2 below.
2.1 NO INDIGENOUS SUPPORT FOR URANIUM MINE
Only 19 participants in the sample of 97, none indigenous, were coded as either unconditionally or conditionally in support of the uranium mine, whereas 35 participants were coded as unconditionally or conditionally opposing the mine. Another 31 supported a moratorium. The support for a moratorium was distributed across the sample: 13 indigenous persons, 9 urban, 5 non-indigenous northerners and 4 rural participants. When those coded as out-rightly opposed to the uranium mine at Cluff Lake were grouped with those wanting a moratorium on the mine it was found that 66 of 97 or 68% of the Local hearings sample did not want the mine to go ahead. Though there was diverse reasoning, 81.5% of urban, 75% of rural and 71% of indigenous participants did not support the go-ahead of the uranium mine. This actual measure of the views of participants did not jibe with, and was overshadowed by, all the “uranium boom” fanfare coming from government and industry and steadily highlighted (“reported”) in the mass media. Remember that the government was both responsible for the inquiry process and a co-owner, through its crown the Saskatchewan Mining and Development Corporation (SMDC), of the uranium ventures under review. In retrospect it seems fair to say the Cluff Lake mine was steamrolled through in spite of the views of local people in the hearings. There is also strong evidence that the go-ahead was given prior to the CLBI completing its recommendations, and we know for sure that the second uranium mine, at Key Lake, was already draining lakes prior to the CLBI reporting. Once the chronology of events is carefully studied it’s hard not to see these inquiries as tools of political legitimacy.
The breakdown of attitudes is most revealing. As already stated, no indigenous participants were among the proponents. Meanwhile, in the media and proponent and pro-uranium elite circles, uranium mining was continually promoted as not only being good for northern development but as having support among needy northerners. “Northerner” was used to include participants from First Nations and Métis communities, as well as non-indigenous northerners living in places like Uranium City and La Ronge. However, when the views of indigenous participants were empirically analyzed it was found that 50% supported a moratorium, 25% were unsure about the project and the rest were out-rightly opposed. There certainly was no groundswell of indigenous support for the uranium mine. Furthermore, all the indigenous organizations, including the District Chiefs and Métis Society had already called for a moratorium on uranium mining and inclusion of Aboriginal Rights in the CLBI, and when this was refused, they boycotted the CLBI. It was also found that it was the non-indigenous northerners that supported the go-ahead of the uranium mine; 11 of 18 or 61% of them in the Local hearings sample supported the mine. Cross-tabulation showed that these 11 were among the 12 sampled participants who lived in majority non-indigenous communities. Ten came from the mining town of Uranium City, which had been involved in uranium mining for U.S. nuclear weapons since the 1950s. Ironically, once the more profitable Cluff Lake and Key Lake mines went into production, the much lower-grade uranium mines at Uranium City were shut down and the town was depopulated. The Gunner mine near Uranium City which opened in 1953 still has not been safely decommissioned and radioactive contaminants continue to spread into the adjacent environment. For a while the federal government even allowed a fish plant to be operated from its toxic site.
The strategy of promoting uranium mining as being in the interests of poverty-stricken northern indigenous communities did not succeed because there was support for the uranium mine among northern indigenous participants in the Local hearings. It succeeded because the views of northern people were not accurately reported in the provincial media or taken seriously by the inquiry process. And the notion that uranium mining was a way to “develop” the north was an ideological story-line that resonated well in some circles in the south. It was attractive because it continued with paternalism towards indigenous people and yet could be made to sound like a step towards self-determination. Northerners, indigenous or otherwise, were not given any fundamental say over what kind of development path they would take. And any inquiry recommendations that might have strengthened their participation, such as a Northern Development Board or revenue-sharing, were rejected outright by a string of governments.
2.2 MORE WOMEN AGAINST URANIUM MINING
The importance of gender in attitudes to uranium mining became apparent in the study of Local hearings. Over half the women in the participants sample (54.8%) were coded as either unconditionally or conditionally opposed to uranium mining, compared to just over one-quarter (29.6%) of all the men. Meanwhile it was found that all (100%) of the non-indigenous northern women were coded as either unconditionally or conditionally in support of the mine. This compared to less than half (48%) of the non-indigenous northern men, over a third (38%) of whom supported a moratorium. As stated earlier, over one-half of all indigenous participants also supported a moratorium. These findings showed the need to contextualize gender within the political economy of uranium mining. The more dependent women were on the industry, the more supportive they were, even while men who had proximity to and may have even worked within the industry, expressed some doubts about it.
The gender gap continued in urban and rural, southern Saskatchewan. In the big cities of Regina and Saskatoon, two-thirds (66.7%) of the women in the Local hearing sample were coded as either unconditionally or conditionally in opposition to uranium mining. This compared to one-third (38.9%) of the urban men in the sample. In rural Saskatchewan a huge majority of women participants (87.5%) were coded as opposing uranium mining, compared to 50% of the rural men in the Local hearings. The results of this analysis were modeled to show how gender and attitudes interrelate. A continuum of support to opposition existed from: i) all non-indigenous women in the north wholeheartedly supporting uranium mining, to ii) no indigenous women in the north supporting and some opposing uranium mining, to iii) no urban women supporting and a majority opposing uranium mining, to iv) the vast majority of rural women opposing uranium mining.
3. TEN YEARS AFTER THE INQUIRIES
In 1986 we initiated a follow-up study to see what reflections participants had about the previous inquiries and whether their views had altered. We started with the 315 participants in our original database, and found that after so many years it was challenging and very time-consuming to successfully trace 169 of these people down. Then by using these contacts to gain further information about the whereabouts of past participants we assembled contact information for 209 people, or 66.6% of the original sample. These people were all invited by mail to participate in the follow-up study. Out of this process we were able to directly contact 114 people in Saskatchewan by mail, telephone or actual visits. With another 20 contacted from out of province we had 134 people, or 73.2% of the 209 we had tracked down. Of these, 28 could not or chose not to participate further. So the follow-up study was based on 106 of the original participants from the uranium inquiry database, 90 of whom were directly interviewed and 16 of whom completed a detailed mail-out questionnaire. Being able to interview 54.7% of those we tracked down, and 33.7 % of the participants in the original database, is good for such follow-up research.
3.1 OPPOSITION GROWING AMONG MEN
The follow-up study enabled us to evaluate changes in attitudes over the period since the inquiries took place. The biggest change was among indigenous men, where a marked shift occurred from large support for a moratorium in 1977-1980 to 50% being out-rightly opposed to uranium mining in 1986. Also there was no support at all for uranium mining among the indigenous men in the follow-up study. This shift was found whether participants were analyzed as indigenous men or in terms of being associated with aboriginal organizations. In contrast to this shift, non-indigenous northerners were slightly more (now 46%) supportive of uranium mining. It’s worth speculating whether this reflected a polarization occurring over the uranium industry along neo-colonial lines in the north.
Interestingly, non-Saskatchewan men also showed a slight shift over this decade towards more opposition to uranium mining. A large shift towards opposition occurred among rural men (58% by 1986). Rural women were already mostly opposed, but in 1986 the overall opposition among all rural participants grew to 72%. There was an anomaly, in the shift found from opposition to more support for a moratorium among urban women, which may relate the size of this urban sub-sample (both men and women) growing from 25% to 46% of all participants in the follow-up study compared to the original database. (It turned out to be much easier to trace down urban than other participants.) But based on the participants own views of their attitudes in 1977-80 and changes by 1986, there was an overall 38.7% increase in opposition compared to a 5.1% increase in support for uranium mining. The shift was mostly among indigenous, rural and urban men.
In the follow-up study we also found that some of those previously placed in the “moratorium” category actually remembered supporting or opposing the uranium industry. So we added two new attitude categories, “proponent moratorium” and “opponent moratorium”. There were 27 of the 106 originally in the moratorium category but with the new codes this dropped to only 9 of 106. Fourteen of the 18 who were placed in the new categories were men (7 of 8 in proponent moratorium and 7 of 10 in the opponent moratorium), which confirms that women were more categorical. With this reanalysis we ended up with 47 of 106 or 44.4% in support of the uranium industry and 50 of 106 or 47.2% in opposition, which presents a much more polarized view of the controversy. Those not wanting to proceed with the mine, including those re-categorized as “proponent moratorium” were now 54.7% of those in the follow-up study compared to 36.8% favouring the go-ahead of the uranium project.
Changes could also be tracked through the coding of major themes. We found some marked changes regarding views of the inquiry process. In the follow-up study participants remembered their views at the time of the inquiries to be much more pro-inquiry than anti-inquiry. The only exception to this was among indigenous and non-indigenous northern men, which may suggest some skepticism about the southern-created inquiry process among all northerners at the time. However, the views registered ten years after the inquiries contrasted sharply with this. Pro-inquiry major theme codes for the same participants dropped from 58 to only 5 and anti-inquiry major theme codes grew from 30 to 52 over this decade. The percentage of all major theme codes that were pro-inquiry dropped from 7.1% in 1977-80 to .06% in 1986, whereas the percentage for anti-inquiry major theme codes went from 3.6% to 5.9% over this period. It’s noteworthy that this change is primarily for men, as women, overall, seemed less interested in evaluating the inquiry process. When major themes on the inquiry process were analyzed by “association groups” it was found that change in the direction of being more critical of the inquiries occurred for all groups except for proponents.
Two main things can be concluded from these findings. First, a decade after the uranium inquiries, the same participants were more opposed to uranium mining; and second, they were more critical of the inquiry process. And it’s interesting that these changes mostly involved men, who could be said to be catching up with what most women participating in the inquiries had already concluded. A lot happened in that decade, though exactly what triggered these attitudinal changes cannot be specifically gleaned from the data. There were major spills at uranium mines during the period between the initial inquiries and our follow-up study which probably played some role. Furthermore, many of the economic benefits promised for indigenous northerners, when the inquiries were high-profile, had not accrued. If these attitudinal changes are generalizable and persistent they could have laid the ground for the outpouring of criticism about the composition and bias of the UDP and the initial broad public skepticism about how the UDP consultations would be run. Perhaps a fragmented, buried, collective memory from experiences with the earlier inquiries found expression during the UDP public consultations. Change occurs on many levels and in many ways and bigger changes often come from accumulating smaller ones.
4. THE SHIFT TO THE SOFT ENERGY PATH
The UDP was about adding economic value to the uranium industry by expanding the nuclear fuel system in Saskatchewan, including building nuclear power plants. In promoting this the ruling Saskatchewan Party was following in the path carved out since the 1980s by the NDP. The NDP was forced by its members and public opinion to draw the line for its support for the uranium-nuclear industry at nuclear power, meaning they supported sending uranium to other places, where nuclear wastes would accumulate and weapons material could be diverted. And they put on their moral blinders about the use of depleted uranium, left from enriching uranium from Saskatchewan, in DU weapons in recent wars. The public consultations, however, showed that there was much greater support (80-85% of 2,263 responses) for going non-nuclear and moving towards renewable energy than for the pro-nuclear UDP report. When on December 19, 2009 the Saskatchewan Party government said they would not follow the UDP recommendation to build nuclear plants in Saskatchewan they ended up with the same contradictory policy as the NDP.
Is there anything in our research from the 1970s and 1980s that was embryonic for this groundswell of support for the soft energy path? The transcript and follow-up studies included a major theme that encapsulates the thinking leading to soft energy. It reads, “The perpetual growth in the demand for energy (including nuclear) is unnecessary and unrealistic in a world of limited resources and will not sustain a quality of life for present or future generations.” It’s instructive to look at the relative place of this theme among the 14 major themes coded for those supporting and opposing uranium mining. And to consider how the implicit support for soft energy reflected by this theme fits into the oppositional and alternative “green” paradigm that we found emerging at the time of the uranium inquiries.
4.1 WERE WOMEN FORGING THE PARADIGM SHIFT?
I have already discussed how gender, economy and geography intersect in a continuum of opposition. If we analyze the distribution of major themes among participants in the follow-up study we find this continuum of opposition goes from its highest among rural women to its lowest among non-indigenous women in the north. Indigenous women are the second most opposed group; while non-Saskatchewan men are the second least opposed (third most supportive). Urban women are the third most opposed group, whereas urban men are the third least opposed (third most supportive). Rural men are the fourth most opposed group, whereas indigenous men are the third least opposed (third most supportive). Non-indigenous northern men sit in the middle, but, based on this major theme analysis, are more opposed than supportive.
How do these groups compare insofar as support for soft, renewable energy? Were any findings from our follow-up study in 1986 suggestive of the strong non-nuclear, pro-renewable views that Perrins found in the UDP consultations in 2009? I believe there are signs of what was to come, though the paradigm shift that was measureable in the 1970s and 1980s was more about values and worldview than about energy policy per se.
In our 1986 study we thematically coded how participants remembered their views during the inquiry. It is these findings that I will concentrate on here. Ninety-five percent (95%) of the major themes of rural women, the group most in opposition to uranium mining, were oppositional. Support for soft energy was the fifth highest theme, at 11% of all this group’s themes. This was the same percentage that was shown for the theme that supports a more holistic, non-scientistic approach to knowledge. The themes most emphasized by rural women were ecological sustainability (29% of themes), distrust of the regulatory system (21%) and support for a sustainable economy (19%). The least mentioned themes had to do with the north and the inquiry process. So while explicit support for soft energy was not that high, when the underlying notion of “sustainability” is considered, a paradigm shift, forged by these women, is more evident. Nearly three-quarters (70%) of the major themes of rural women reflect this paradigm shift in some way and I will take this as a benchmark for comparing other groups.
Ninety-three percent (93%) of the major themes emphasized by indigenous women were oppositional. And, interestingly, support for soft energy was the second/third highest, at 19% of total themes remembered from the inquiries. This was the same percentage as the theme stressing sustainable northern development. It is very noteworthy that the most emphasized theme among indigenous women was about skepticism for the state’s regulation of environmental health (31% of all their themes). Ecological sustainability and holistic knowledge were the two least emphasized themes, at 6% each; and a sustainable economy was fourth highest, at 12.5% of all themes. If we add up the same themes as we did for rural women we get only 43% of all themes; however the additional of northern sustainability (19% of all themes) brings the total percent close to that of rural women (62.5% compared to 70% of all themes). And it is to be expected that women living in or connected to the north will express their attitudes and values through a different lens than rural women.
Just how important is gender in this apparent shift to support non-nuclear technology and ecological sustainability? This is not self-evident as the non-indigenous northern women had an astonishing 97% of their major themes supporting uranium mining. And they showed no support at all for soft energy. This confirms that attitudes intersect with proximity to and perceived dependency upon the uranium industry. In other words political economy and related ideological-cultural factors contextualize gender differences. And it seems that proximity can work both ways. While non-indigenous women living in the north were highly supportive of uranium mining; so, too, were men living out of province. While these men had a political economic and ideological link to the industry or to pro-nuclear government departments they did not live in proximity to, or directly face the consequences of, the uranium mines. It’s obviously easily to support something that benefits you while you are at a safe distance. While proponents were pushing through uranium mines in indigenous regions of northern Saskatchewan, non-indigenous people in British Columbia and Nova Scotia whose watersheds and human health would be directly affected were winning moratoria on uranium mining. These moratoria have now been legislated in both provinces. People in New Brunswick, Quebec and the Ottawa region are presently working for a similar ban on uranium mining. It’s hard not to see this double standard as being racialistic and neo-colonial.
Nevertheless, the third most oppositional group, with 76% of their major themes opposing uranium mining, was also women – urban women. Did these women support soft energy and did they show signs of a paradigm shift towards sustainability? Only eleven percent (11%) of all their major themes supported soft energy, which is the same as among rural women. And the major theme for ecological sustainability was lower for urban women; 19% of all themes compared to 29% for rural women. So, too, was the major theme about a sustainable economy (8% compared to 19%) and the one on holistic knowledge (6% compared to 11%). If you add up the major themes that reflect a paradigm shift you get a much smaller total of 45% of all themes compared to 70% for rural women. Even if you add in the greater percentages for the major theme stressing northern sustainability, urban women don’t come very close to rural or indigenous women.
4.2 THE CULTURAL AND ETHICAL SHIFT
How did support for soft energy stack up for men? Rural men, non-indigenous and indigenous men were similar in the percentage of major themes showing opposition to uranium mining (57%, 57% and 55% respectively). However none of these groups of men came close to the female groups in their emphasis on soft energy. This major theme was only 4% of all themes for rural and non-indigenous northern men, and only 2.5% of all themes for indigenous men. This suggests men, including indigenous men, were far more tied to conventional industrial technology which extracts non-renewable resources. We can still see this inclination among some local non-indigenous male business leaders and Métis and First Nations male leaders in the province. Nor were the major themes which reflect a paradigm shifts towards sustainability as predominant among male groups. When ecology, economy and knowledge are added in with soft energy this still only totaled 39% of all rural male themes, 30% of all non-indigenous northern male themes and 25.5% of those for indigenous men. The major themes of urban men were more supportive of uranium mining than they were oppositional (65% to 35%), and the theme for soft energy was only 6% of the total themes for this group. If you add in ecology, economy and knowledge you still only get 23% of all themes, which is about one-half that for urban women.
So, once the matter of direct dependency and proximity is addressed there seems to be strong indication from both our transcript study of Local hearings, and from our 1986 follow-up study, that women, whether indigenous or not, were far more along in this paradigm shift; though rural women seem to be where the shift was most marked. While there is not a major focus on soft energy per se, the values and thinking that lie behind and complement this are already pronounced.
Was this a precursor to what Dolter and Arbuthnott call the “new ecology Identity” of those who during the UDP consultations so stringently opposed the expansion of the nuclear fuel system in Saskatchewan? Does it reflect what they call the value of “unacceptable risk” upheld by opponents to the UDP’s pro-nuclear recommendations; the unwillingness to trade-off future burdens for short-term benefits? Is this, then, fundamentally about the sustainability ethic of inter-generational justice? Do the comparative differences and the shifts found in our research in the 1970s and 1980s already reflect a moving away from the patriarchal stratification of society and knowledge and the objectification of nature, along the lines emphasized by “eco-feminism”? Is the paradigm shift coming more from a convergence that includes post-colonial consciousness that doesn’t necessary express itself in feminism? Are we perhaps seeing a deep historical shift in our cultural and ethical worldview from scientism towards sustainability?
When you consider the historical origins of uranium mining and the nuclear industry in the military and the ongoing threat from weapons proliferation, and the radioactive contamination that occurs from mine tailings to nuclear reactor releases and wastes, it should probably come as no surprise that the nuclear controversy is a catalyst for such a paradigm shift. An in-depth analysis of the UDP consultations may show the shift is spreading across more groupings; there are already some indications that the shift is occurring with the upcoming, more deeply “green” generations. The most interesting question is when the shift will start to directly affect indigenous politics in the north and what role indigenous women will play in this. March 1, 2010
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[1] Dan Perrins, Future of Uranium Public Consultation Process, Prepared for Saskatchewan Ministry of Energy and Resources, August 31, 2009.
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Note: This paper will be posted at my website – http://jimharding.brinkster.net