The End of Cheap Uranium

[Oscar]

The End of Cheap Uranium

< http://ihp-lx2.ethz.ch/energy21/endofcheapuranium.pdf >

Michael Dittmar

Institute of Particle Physics,
ETH, 8093 Zurich, Switzerland
Journal: Science of the Total Environment
submitted June 25, 2012 and accepted 11.4.2013

Abstract

Historic data from many countries demonstrate that on average no more than 50-70% of the uranium in a deposit could be mined. An analysis of more recent data from Canada and Australia leads to a mining model with an average deposit extraction lifetime of 10 ± 2 years. This simple model provides an accurate description of the extractable amount of uranium for the recent mining operations.

Using this model for all larger existing and planned uranium mines up to 2030, a global uranium mining peak of at most 58 ± 4 ktons around the year 2015 is obtained. Thereafter, we predict that uranium mine production will decline to at most 54 ± 5 ktons by 2025 and, with the decline steepening, to at most 41 ± 5 ktons around 2030. This amount will not be sufficient to fuel the existing and planned nuclear power plants during the next 10-20 years. In fact, we find that it will be difficult to avoid supply shortages even under a slow 1%/year worldwide nuclear energy phase-out scenario up to 2025. We thus suggest that a worldwide nuclear energy phase-out is in order.

If such a slow global phase-out is not voluntarily effected, the end of the present cheap uranium supply situation will be unavoidable. The result will be that some countries will simply be unable to afford sufficient uranium fuel at that point, which implies involuntary and perhaps chaotic nuclear phase-outs in those countries involving brownouts, blackouts, and worse.

1 Introduction

Nuclear fission energy in industrial societies is often proposed as a long term replacement for the limited fossil fuel resources and as a solution to the environmental problems related to their use. However, even 50 years after commercial nuclear fission power began, nuclear reactors produce less than 14% of the world’s electric energy, which itself makes only about 16% of our final energy demand [1]. More than 80% of the 440 nuclear power plants, with a capacity of 374 GWe [2], are operated in the richer OECD countries, where they produce about 21% of the annual electric energy [1]. The relatively small nuclear energy contribution today indicates that even a minor transition from fossil to nuclear fuel for generating electric energy over the next 20 to 30 years would require significant increases in the use of nuclear fuel.

During the last few years a “nuclear energy renaissance” strategy was discussed in many countries. However, after the 2011 Fukushima disaster, the enthusiasm to build new reactors has slowed down in most countries and even the planning for some replacement strategies for the aging existing nuclear power plant in most OECD countries has been brought essentially to a standstill. From the 68 reactors currently under construction in 14 countries, one finds that 46 of them are build in just three countries –China, India and Russia [ 2]. As a result, even the Word Nuclear Association (WNA) can imagine at most a worldwide nuclear growth scenario of 1-2%/year during the next 10-15 years [3]. Among the many problems related with this small growth scenario is the little discussed but fundamental issue of uranium fuel supply [4].

In this paper we present our findings about the future uranium supply. Our results are obtained from a study of deposit depletion profiles from past and present uranium mining. Our analysis shows that the existing and planned uranium mines up to 2030 allow at most an increase of the uranium supply from 54 ktons (54 000 tons) in 2010 [5] to 58 ± 4 ktons in 2015. Furthermore, the data indicate that after 2015 production will decline by at least 0.5 ktons/year. The annual uranium supply around 2025 and 2030 is thus predicted to reach at most 54 ± 5 ktons and 41 ± 5 ktons respectively. These numbers are not even anywhere near the present global usage, about 68 ktons/year, and imply significant shortages over coming decades.

We thus predict an end of the current situation of cheap uranium and a voluntary or forced worldwide nuclear phase-out scenario. It is in fact roughly consistent with the new policies, following the Fukushima accident, proposed in May 2011 by the governments in Germany and Switzerland.

We start our analysis with countries where uranium mining was stopped or reduced to about 10% of the past production levels because of depletion (Section 2). The more accurate recent mining data from Canada and Australia are used to formulate a simple and accurate mining and depletion model (Section 3). In Section 4 this model is applied to the currently operating and planned future uranium mines up to 2030

2 Lessons from past uranium mining and depletion
2.1 Uranium depletion I: Europe and Africa
2.2 Uranium depletion II: USA and South Africa


3 A hypothesis about the mining of uranium deposits
3.1 The Hypothesis: Deposit exploitation and mining lifetimes

4 Extraction profiles, the future demand/supply situa-tion
4.1 Uranium demand and other supply estimates

5 Summary

The data about terminated uranium mining in different countries and regions demonstrate that on average only 50-70% of initial uranium resource estimates can be extracted.

Using the more precise data about the uranium extraction from recent individual mines and deposits in Canada and Australia a depletion model for modern uranium mines can be derived.

This model states that modern mines minimize the extractions costs such that the mining of a given deposit result in (1) an effective lifetime of 10 ± 2 years and (2) the total amount of extractable uranium from a given deposit can be approximated by the achieved (or planned) annual plateau value multiplied by 10.

This model is applied to existing and planned uranium mines and an upper production limit for uranium extraction in different countries and for the entire planet is obtained up to 2030.

In detail we find that:
• A production decline from essentially all mines operating on particular deposits is un-avoidable during the present decade.
• This decline can only be partially compensated by the planned new mines.
• Assuming that all new uranium mines can be opened as planned, annual mining will be increased from the 2010 level of 54 ktons to about 58 ± 4 ktons in 2015.
• After 2015 uranium mining will decline by about 0.5 ktons/year up to 2025 and much faster thereafter. The resulting maximal annual production is predicted as 56 ± 5 ktons (2020), 54 ± 5 ktons (2025) and 41 ± 5 ktons (2030).

Assuming that the demand side will be increased by 1% annually, we predict both shortages of uranium and (inflation-adjusted) price hikes within the next five years. A way to delay a supply crunch until 2025 could be a voluntary nuclear energy phase-out in many countries. Such a phase-out of conventional U235 based nuclear power plants appeared to be very unlikely at the beginning of 2011, but the recent accident in the Japanese Fukushima nuclear power complex could lead to totally different prospects.

Another alternative to avoid shortfalls during this decade would be a “wider” opening of the still sizable quantities of the military uranium reserves from the USA and Russia especially after 2013. The military uranium reserves have been estimated in a 2009 paper, [24], to be roughly 200 ktons for the USA and 300 ktons for Russia. Although any such increases involve political issues that clearly go beyond the scope of our analysis, this source, depending on the demand growth, could in principle delay uranium shortages for several years. However, it is obvious that these strategic military reserves are very finite and it seems unlikely that they will be opened easily for the demand in China and Europe.

Therefore, assuming that a global nuclear slow phase-out scenario will not be chosen on a voluntary basis, we predict that the end of the cheap uranium supply will result in a chaotic phase-out scenario with price explosions, supply shortages and possible electricity shortages in many countries

- - - END - - -